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ABSTRACT 
The high rate of Indigenous incarceration is a problem for public policy and 
therefore for historical and social analysis. This paper compares and contrasts two 
recent attempts at such analysis: Thalia Anthony’s Indigenous People, Crime and 
Punishment (2013) and Don Weatherburn’s Arresting Incarceration: Pathways Out of 
Indigenous Imprisonment (2014). My question is: what difference do these books’ 
contrasting narrative models of Australian history make to our thinking about 
contemporary Indigenous incarceration? My reading reveals several differences and 
similarities in their perspectives: how they position themselves in relation to the 
values that shape Australian debate about punishment; their historical understanding 
of the institutions of ‘protection’ and of the impact of ‘assimilation’; whether the law 
and order apparatus is systemically biased against Indigenous Australians; and 
whether Indigenous Australians should be understood as a ‘community of fate’. 
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Introduction: Kath Walker’s prediction 
In December 1964, the Secretary of the Queensland State Council for Advancement 
of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, Kath Walker, predicted that as more and 
more of her people were assimilated, some would flourish and some would fail. If we 
see imprisonment as a form of failure, then her prediction seems to have been 
confirmed: the lives of many Indigenous Australians are punctuated with 
imprisonment and other adverse contacts with the criminal justice system. Indeed, 
‘The depth and breadth of Aboriginal contact with the criminal justice system … 
almost defies belief’, writes Don Weatherburn (2014, p. 2). The crude imprisonment 
rate for Indigenous women in 2012 was 375.5 per hundred thousand, compared with 
16.2 per hundred thousand for non-Indigenous women; for men the Indigenous rate 
was 4227.5, towering over the non-Indigenous rate of 236.9 per hundred thousand 
(Weatherburn 2014, pp. 2–3). Criminologists have suggested that, for some 
Aboriginal communities, prison has become part of their domain, and a period in 
prison a normal and not shameful phase of one’s life-course (Cunneen et al. 2013, 
pp. 144–147). 
Are the imprisoned failing, or is Australian society failing to decolonise Indigenous 
people in such a way as to respect their many differences from the mainstream? 
One’s view on this question will draw on one’s deepest understandings of Australian 
history and of the distribution of responsibilities between colonists and colonised 
who are also, in common, citizens. In this paper, I contrast two narrative models 
present in current research in Aboriginal criminology. One, illustrated by Thalia 
Anthony’s Indigenous People, Crime and Punishment (2013), emphasises the continuity in 
Australian colonial history between all forms of institutional control of Indigenous 
Australians and their current high rates of incarceration; in addition, this model does 
not treat as significant the high proportion of Indigenous Australians who do not 
suffer imprisonment or adverse contact with the forces of law and order. This model 
postulates Indigenous Australia, in effect, as a ‘community of fate’, that continues to 
suffer systemic, collective oppression rooted in the colonial past. The other, 
contrasting model is more attentive to historical discontinuity—in particular to the 
distinction between recent criminal imprisonment and earlier regimes of institutional 
management; it is attentive to differentiating effects of assimilation policy among 
Indigenous Australians. In this second model, illustrated by Don Weatherburn’s 
Arresting Incarceration: Pathways Out of Indigenous Imprisonment (2014), Indigenous 
Australians have not continued to be a ‘community of fate’, as some have flourished 
socio-economically while others live in ways that are both disadvantaged and 
criminogenic. The two models give rise to different perspectives on public policy. 
The former model problematises the law itself, and focuses on the issues of judicial 
authority and judicial reasoning; the approach of the latter model is not to question 
the law but to pathologise the law-breakers and to seek changes in social policy and 
in sentencing options that would optimise their social integration. 
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Let us return to Walker’s 1964 prediction. She made her remark at the Centre for 
Research into Aboriginal Affairs at Monash University, during a conference on 
‘Aborigines in the economy’. The theme of that gathering was the economics of 
assimilation; it focused on ‘the types of jobs in which Aborigines are at present 
engaged, their proficiency at their tasks and their earnings from them’, and on ‘the 
size, location and skills of the Aboriginal labour force and the extent and diversity of 
jobs available to provide employment now and in the future’ (Sharp & Tatz 1966, p. vii). 
Although few, if any, of the participants would have questioned the government’s 
assimilation goal to enable Aboriginal people eventually to sell their labour for the 
award level of wages, two clergy associated with missions, Bishop J.P. O’Loughlin 
and Pastor Paul Albrecht, sounded a warning. Remote Aboriginal people would be at 
risk as they transited from the closed and semi-closed mission economies to a world 
in which they would freely receive and spend more cash than had ever been at their 
disposal. Pastor Paul Albrecht pointed to alcohol abuse in Central Australia, 
predicting that it would increase with higher wages. 
Responding to O’Loughlin’s and Albrecht’s warnings of assimilation’s perils, Walker 
drew on personal experience of Queensland Aborigines who had ‘got out from under 
the Act’ and made the transition to normal citizenship status. As the Queensland 
authorities had feared, some Aborigines, when suddenly promoted from ‘child’ to 
‘adult’, at first misused their money. However, Walker reassured the conference, 
‘after a while they levelled off’ (Walker 1966, p. 186). She then warned: 
There are some who will never ever make the grade, but the average are 
not any different from any other society or any other race. You all have 
your rejects. We are no different. We too are quite well aware of the fact 
that some of our people will not make the grade and we are not as naïve 
as to think that all of us can be rescued. Some of us will be left behind, 
as you yourselves have left some of your own people behind (1966, p. 186). 
To read recent analyses of the high rate of Indigenous imprisonment is an 
opportunity to explore one meaning of Walker’s prediction that, in their adaptation 
to the pressures of Australian society and in their seizing of its opportunities, 
Indigenous Australians would become differentiated. For some Indigenous 
Australians it has become normal to be at odds with the criminal law, while others 
are unlikely to be arrested, convicted and imprisoned. Thalia Anthony and Don 
Weatherburn agree that excessive Indigenous incarceration is a most disturbing 
product of Australia’s colonial history, but these authors have approached in 
different ways the question of whether, and in what ways, socio-economic and 
cultural differences among Indigenous Australian are relevant to understanding their 
high rates of incarceration. 
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In order to describe how their models differ, I introduce the term ‘community of 
fate’, borrowing from another analytic context: contemporary political theory about 
the problem of representing historically disadvantaged groups in contemporary 
liberal-democratic societies (for example, Dawson 1994; Williams 1998, 2009; Dovi 
2002). To be within a ‘community of fate’ is to share a historically-determined 
structural position with others of one’s category (for example, women, African-
Americans) in such a way that one is, in common with others in one’s category, 
systematically disadvantaged. 1  While both Anthony and Weatherburn write as if 
Indigenous Australians are a community of fate, Weatherburn also qualifies his 
implicit commitment to that idea by drawing attention to significant differences 
among Indigenous trajectories, and, on this basis, he invites attention to the policy-
relevance of such distinctions among Indigenous Australians. I conclude my 
comparison of these two books by suggesting that whether we suppose Indigenous 
Australians to be a ‘community of fate’ has become a significant interpretive issue for 
those concerned with Indigenous history and public policy. While my sympathies are 
more with Weatherburn’s approach, I encourage readers to consider seriously the 
challenge of Anthony’s critical criminology. 
Assimilation as a differentiator 
The agenda of assimilation policy (c. 1940–75) included not only undoubtedly 
harmful interventions in Indigenous family life and disrespect for Indigenous 
heritage but also reforms whose impact has been mixed. The repeal of many laws 
that, in the name of ‘protection’, had limited the rights of Indigenous Australians, 
including their welfare entitlements and their rights of free association with non-
Indigenous people in towns and cities, was largely completed by the mid-1970s. One 
of the lasting effects of this program of legal reform and institutional change has 
been the persistence and arguably the deepening of the problem of the Indigenous 
criminal and prisoner. Recent criminological writings agree that even these 
liberalising elements of assimilation have contributed to imprisonment. Anthony 
writes that under assimilation policy many hitherto sequestered and excluded 
Aborigines were admitted to towns, cities and roads where it was difficult for them 
to find jobs and where their unorthodox comportment has been readily invigilated 
and, in some respects, criminalised (Anthony 2013, pp. 47–48). Similarly, Cunneen 
and his co-authors see assimilation policy as having weakened the ‘disciplinary 
regimes of the reserves, settlements, missions and pastoral stations’; the resulting 
                                                 
1  Neither Anthony nor Weatherburn uses the term ‘community of fate’ and each has neither 
endorsed nor criticised my use of that term (in an earlier draft) when reading their work. My use of 
the phrase should not be understood as referring to any inherent feature of Indigenous Australians. 
I do not believe that Indigenous Australians share any inherent features other than those they 
share with the rest of the human species. I emphatically reject any inference that Indigenous 
Australians are inherently criminal. 
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urbanisation of Aborigines intensified ‘non-Indigenous racial concerns’ (Cunneen et 
al. 2013, p. 32). For Weatherburn, the way that assimilation contributed to 
Aborigines’ high rate of imprisonment was that it granted them access to alcohol and 
to cash welfare payments at a time when, coincidentally, they were less likely to be 
under the discipline of employment (Weatherburn 2014, p. 17). 
In these same writings, we are less likely to see it acknowledged that assimilation has 
also enabled many Indigenous Australians to adapt socio-economically, and that such 
people avoid adverse contact with the justice system. However, Weatherburn’s 
analysis presents two glimpses of those who—in Kath Walker’s words—have ‘made 
the grade’. Weatherburn examines a cohort of Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
residents of New South Wales born in 1984. A higher proportion of the Indigenous 
(75.6 per cent) than the non-Indigenous (16.9 per cent) members of this cohort had 
been cautioned by police, referred to a youth justice conference or convicted of an 
offence (Weatherburn 2014, p. 5). It is significant that almost one quarter of the Indigenous 
cohort (24.4 per cent) had no such contact. As well, Weatherburn has developed a 
mathematical model of the dynamics of the Indigenous prison population, showing 
that a large proportion, at any time, consists of people who have been imprisoned 
before (Weatherburn 2014, pp. 105–109). If a relatively small proportion of the 
Aboriginal population generates the relatively high rate of Indigenous imprisonment, 
then we have further reason not to overlook the significant phenomenon of 
Aboriginal people who do not have adverse contact with the legal system. While, 
from the point of view of many Indigenous Australians, brushes with the law and 
even imprisonment have become ‘normal’, it would be inaccurate (and insulting) to 
typify early 21st century Indigenous Australia as criminal and incarcerated. Many 
Indigenous Australians have flourished materially, in terms of self-respect and in 
keeping out of the criminal courts; they have ‘made the grade’ without losing their 
identity as Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. They are unlikely to fall foul of the 
law or to go to prison. As Walker predicted 50 years ago, the Indigenous fate became 
differentiated as assimilation policy terminated the supervisions and restrictions that 
‘protection’ had imposed. 
However, at the same time as it became possible to see this differentiation emerging 
within the Indigenous population, a discourse arose that emphasises Indigenous 
commonalities. A ‘pan-Aboriginal’ or Indigenist perspective has arisen since the 
1930s, largely in order to deny the significance of differences of ‘caste’ or ‘blood’—
distinctions expressed with divisive consequences by the legislation that, under 
assimilation policy, governments have since repealed. The memory of white 
authorities’ invidious ‘caste’ distinctions has lingered long after these distinctions 
have lost their purchase on law and administration. That bitter memory is the basis 
of a fervent discourse of shared Indigenous heritage and fate. 
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When contemporary intellectuals present Indigenous Australians as a people united 
by their historic fate, by their styles of sociality and by their interests, they frequently 
use the example of the ‘half caste’/ ‘full blood’ distinction in order to question the 
ethics, politics and descriptive adequacy of any socio-political description that 
highlights distinctions, including distinctions of region, class and cultural orientation. 
For example, the Indigenous lawyer Louise Taylor, discussing the possibility of a 
treaty between Australia and its Indigenous peoples in 2003, questioned the 
distinction, that some sceptical commentators had made, between the Indigenous 
‘elite’ and other Indigenous Australians. The political significance of making this 
distinction, she wrote, was that it alienated ‘“professional” Aboriginal people from 
our remote or rural (read real, authentic) brothers and sisters’ (Taylor 2003, p. 92). 
She declared that Aboriginal elites share with Aboriginal non-elites the defining 
experiences of being Aboriginal; thus they could ‘authoritatively speak on … subjects 
which are of major significance in rural and remote communities’ (Taylor 2003, p. 93). 
To draw attention to class distinctions among Indigenous Australians seemed to 
Taylor to be similar in its political logic to the older government practice of 
differentiating ‘full-blood’ from ‘half-caste’ Aborigines; both practices have resulted 
in, or would now lead to, the spurious disqualification of certain people 
as ‘Aborigines’. 
Undoubtedly, the assertion of Indigenous commonality has had important political 
work to do. According to Jeremy Beckett, such emphasis on the shared historical fate 
and distinct entitlements of Indigenous people has been encouraged by the political 
culture of welfare capitalism in Australia and elsewhere. The rhetoric in which 
welfare is claimed and granted in societies such as Australia is ‘moralistic’, he suggests: 
to be Indigenous is to present oneself as distinctly deserving: 
This kind of political culture offers indigenous minorities the possibility 
of transcending their small numbers and powerlessness, while giving 
governments the opportunity of demonstrating their humanity at what 
may be relatively small cost. Thus in Australia, Aborigines as well as 
various immigrant groups have judged it more advantageous to follow 
this strategy rather than play class or party politics (Beckett 2014, p. 170). 
The pertinent point, for this paper, is that the political discourse of Indigeneity 
tends to refuse or downplay class identities; in the mobilisation of ‘Indigenous’ as a 
category naming a politically powerful claim, the idea that Indigenous Australians 
have become socio-economically differentiated among themselves is discounted. 
We should take Beckett’s term ‘moralistic’ in a neutral sense. He is not complaining 
that the representations of Indigenous commonality make a gratuitous appeal to our 
conscience; rather his point is that much contemporary Indigenous discourse 
highlights the moral dimension of the Indigenous/non-Indigenous distinction. 
To evoke the moral unity of Indigenous people vis-à-vis their historic adversary, 
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colonising authority, puts in question, or pushes to the background, other 
distinctions that one might make, such as the distinctions of class, cultural 
disposition and moral outlook that may be emergent among Indigenous Australians 
and that can be found also among non-Indigenous Australians. 
This emphasis on the moral dimension of the Indigenous/non-Indigenous 
distinction and the corollary assertion of Indigenous normative unity is evident in the 
following statement by the late Ruby Langford, a writer whose subjects included the 
life of her sometimes convicted and imprisoned son Nobby and brother Kevin. 
Asked by Robyn Hughes to explain her intentions in writing Haunted by the Past 
(Langford 1999), Langford began by noting that ‘we’re the most incarcerated people 
in Her Majesty’s jails in this country’. Asserting that Nobby’s initial conviction had 
been ‘wrongful’, she continued: 
My son’s not a bad, evil man. He’s done some stupid things and been 
easily led and stuff like that, but we’re all human, but nobody’s been 
murdered or maimed, and his continual fight to just get justice, you 
know? And Aboriginal people don’t have justice. How can we be the 
most bad, evil people in the whole of this now multicultural Australia 
when we’re not quite two percent, as I said, of a total population which 
now stands at 18 million? You know? We don’t have any justice because 
Aboriginal people always had to conform to the laws of the invading 
powers of our country, because we were never allowed to be ourselves. 
We had assimilation forced on us, had to give away language, identity 
and become like white people. And even today, governments do not 
classify urban Aboriginal people with a degree of Abo ... caste of, you 
know, caste in us, like half-caste, quarter-caste, you can’t say that today. 
You’re either Aboriginal or white, but years ago it used to be you were 
half-caste, quarter-caste, full-blood, three-quarter-caste, one-eighth-
octoroon, you know? This is how they defined us. But even today the 
governments of Australia define us, urban Kooris of mixed blood, as not 
real Aboriginals. Aboriginals here according to them are the traditional 
tribal ones out in the desert sitting on a rock with a spear in his hand. 
You see, this is how they’ve always defined us, but we define ourselves as 
the children of the Indigenous people, you know, the ancestors of the 
Indigenous people, and we’re sick of other people telling us who we are 
(Hughes 1995, pp. 59–61). 
In these words, we see several themes of contemporary Indigenous self-
representation: that the unjust structure of Australian society stems from the unjust 
foundational act of colonisation; that this injustice has long been expressed in 
demands that Aboriginal people conform to colonists’ rules, demands that continue 
in the contemporary criminal justice system; that colonial authority has denied 
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Aboriginal people self-representation and that Aboriginal people are fighting that 
denial by asserting the common Aboriginality of ‘urban’ and ‘tribal’, ‘half cast’ and 
‘full blood’. The post-assimilation political discourse that has championed self-
determination and Indigenous rights has presented Indigenous Australians as a 
wrongfully treated and morally unified people that must be recognised, collectively, 
as entitled to respectful acts of recognition and restitution. 
These themes resonate strongly in contemporary criminology that explains high rates 
of Indigenous imprisonment by referring to the shared historical trajectory and 
aggregate socio-economic disadvantage of Indigenous Australians. That many 
Indigenous Australians are not convicted of offences and do not go to gaol are facts 
of little significance in this narrative of oppressed people-hood. 
However, Weatherburn’s Arresting Incarceration: Pathways Out of Indigenous Imprisonment, 
while not denying that Indigenous Australians have been collectively subject to 
colonial oppression, offers an alternative explanatory model that draws attention to 
certain differences that have emerged among Indigenous Australians. In paying 
attention to the fact that many Indigenous people have no adverse contact with the 
criminal law and are unlikely to be imprisoned, his work elaborates, in effect, Kath 
Walker’s 50-year-old prediction that Aborigines would differ in their ways of using 
the freedoms conceded by assimilation. Whereas Anthony consistently postulates 
Indigenous Australians as a community of fate, Weatherburn is more open to seeing 
policy-relevant differences among Indigenous Australians. In the rest of this paper I 
explore further the differences between Anthony and Weatherburn. 
Which morality is the problem? 
As you would expect of authors on this topic, both Anthony and Weatherburn are 
politically self-aware; each seeks to situate him/herself in relation to what they see as 
the most powerful tendencies in Australian culture that shape our institutions of 
social control. 
In company with a strong Durkheimian tradition in the social study of punishment 
(Garland 1990, pp. 23–92) Anthony understands punishment regimes as enacting and 
reproducing an Australian conscience collective—a hegemonic tradition of conscious and 
unconscious, morally-textured imagining of commonality and difference in 
Australian society. Distancing her own views from this determining mindset, her 
account of Australian sentencing is presented as illustrating and confirming the 
critical descriptions of Australian culture by Ghassan Hage (1998) and Jennifer 
Rutherford (2000). Anthony makes several allusions to Hage’s account of the 
dominant representations (conscious and unconscious), in racial and ethnic terms, of 
the ‘national space’ of Australia. ‘The white fantasy that treats Indigenous people as 
outsiders emerges from the history of white dominance and colonization’ (Anthony 
2013, p. 70). To similar effect, she cites Jennifer Rutherford’s Lacan-inspired critique 
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of ‘the colonizing state’s psyche and relationship with the Other’, a relationship that 
enacts, through official punishment, the link between ‘morality and aggression in 
Australian history’ (Anthony 2013, pp. 20, 54, 180). 
When Weatherburn evokes a prevailing Australian morality, he explicitly positions 
himself as not contesting it. He suggests that it would be to ‘put your head in the 
sand’ to ignore or oppose what he understands to be the moral sensibility pervading 
Australian public discussions about crime and punishment: ‘the almost universal 
belief that people who continually or seriously breach the law should not “be allowed 
to get away with it”’ (Weatherburn 2014, p. 88). However repellent his readers may 
find that powerful morality when it gives rise to Indigenous incarceration, it has to be 
accepted as a constraint on public policy, he suggests. A ‘lasting reduction in the 
number of Indigenous Australians in prison’ will not be brought about by a cultural 
politics that seeks ‘dramatic changes in sentencing and penal policy’ (Weatherburn 
2014, p. 88). Thus Weatherburn pragmatically situates himself alongside or inside the 
Australian public’s way of thinking about crime and punishment (as he understands it). 
He is interested in non-dramatic reform, based on rigorously evaluated program 
experiments (and his book is rooted in a literature of applied social science). In 
contrast, Anthony distances herself from the prevailing moral tradition as 
colonialism’s obnoxious legacy. Consistent with this difference, Anthony and 
Weatherburn differ in what they take to be problematic. For Anthony it is the way 
judges enact colonial sovereignty when dealing with sentences and bail applications; 
for Weatherburn it is the way some Indigenous Australians behave. 
It is a strength of Anthony’s book that she devotes many pages to the changing 
themes of judges’ sentencing discourse—the crucial expression of the ethos of settler 
colonial punishment. When judges are faced with an Indigenous offender or 
defendant, they draw on available representations of ‘the Indigenous’, and the 
content of these representations is a major determinant of Indigenous incarceration. 
Until recently, sentencing authorities recognised Indigeneity as a mitigating factor: 
the grounds for leniency were either that the Indigenous person was a member of a 
distinct normative culture with its own punishments or that his/her life had been so 
harsh and deprived (by Australian standards) as to warrant leniency. However, in 
recent times, sentencing authorities have taken a more critical view of the convicted 
person’s distinct normative culture. Judges have regarded the Indigenous milieu less 
as a source of culturally appropriate punishments and more as an encouragement to 
criminal behaviour. In a parallel change, courts have been less ready to assume that an 
Indigenous life is harsh and deprived. Both shifts in judicial opinion have made 
judges less willing to spare offenders a custodial sentence or to reduce such sentences. 
Anthony asserts that this recent re-imagining of the Indigenous criminal has 
contributed to higher rates of incarceration. 
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In setting out this recent history, Anthony is not merely regretting that judges have 
shifted from one set of representations of Indigeneity that tend to reduce 
incarceration to another set of representations that tend to increase it. More 
fundamentally, she questions whether, in criminal sentencing, the state should 
assume an unaccountable prerogative to recognise Indigeneity. Whether that 
recognition works to the benefit (leniency) or detriment (severity) of Indigenous 
Australians, it is problematic, she argues, because Indigenous authority plays little or 
no part in the recognition process. In the reformed settler-colonial state that 
Anthony advocates, Indigenous and non-Indigenous authorities would share the 
responsibility/privilege of recognising the ‘Indigeneity’ of convicted persons and of 
sentencing them. She conjectures that this sharing of authority would lead to what 
she considers to be a better punishment regime: a lower rate of Indigenous 
imprisonment. 
Weatherburn’s book has a different focus. Accepting (however pragmatically) the 
prevailing Australian views about culpability, he does not ask how judges have been 
thinking about ‘Indigeneity’; rather his main question is: why does a relatively high 
proportion of the Indigenous population commit so much crime of such a severe 
nature as to incur long periods of imprisonment? The quality of judicial thought is 
not irrelevant to Weatherburn—judges’ willingness to consider non-custodial 
sentences is one theme vital to his book—but he is much more interested than 
Anthony in the socio-economic and criminal characteristics of convicted Indigenous 
Australians.  
Racial bias in the law and order system?  
Do statistics on conviction and incarceration support the thesis that the Australian 
law and order system, from surveillance to sentencing, is loaded against Indigenous 
Australians? Weatherburn devotes fourteen pages to expressing his doubts about 
‘systemic bias’. He argues that there is no convincing evidence that Indigenous over-
representation in prison is the result of deliberate racial discrimination by agents such 
as police (in their surveillance, arresting and charging) and judges (in their sentencing 
and bail decisions). Nor is he persuaded that excessive Indigenous incarceration is 
the result of certain laws and punishment practices that—intentionally or not—are 
more likely to implicate Aborigines. That the system results in high rates of 
Indigenous incarceration is not enough to justify labelling the system as ‘racist’, he 
argues. Weatherburn insists that we cannot judge the system’s racial character on the 
basis of outcomes (such as incarceration rates) alone: we need to see evidence of 
‘malevolent intent or wilful neglect’ (Weatherburn 2014, p. 54). To explain why 
Indigenous offending, arrest and imprisonment rates are much higher than non-
Indigenous rates, he looks to socio-economic factors that are present in the lives of 
incarcerated people: poor parenting (with child abuse/neglect), low levels of formal 
education, unemployment, substance abuse. 
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Anthony acknowledges that while some analyses conclude that the law and order 
system discriminates against Indigenous Australians, others conclude that the high 
rate of imprisonment is a fair reflection of the volume and seriousness of the 
offences for which Indigenous Australians are convicted. Early studies of sentencing 
outcomes (using data since the 1960s) showed that courts faced with Indigenous 
offenders were more likely to choose imprisonment as a punishment than in 
sentencing non-Indigenous offenders (Anthony 2013, pp. 59–60). More recently, 
many studies show that there is no discrimination or even that there is a tendency to 
treat Indigenous offenders more leniently. 
In the course of Anthony’s discussion, a methodological issue of great interest 
emerges. As Anthony points out, when Indigenous and non-Indigenous cases are 
compared, the researcher posing the question of ‘discrimination’ has to make a 
choice about which variables—unequally present within the two compared 
populations, but with a significant bearing on the dependent variable: 
imprisonment—to take into account and to control for. The selection of such 
variables is a matter of judgment, guided by theoretical models. The conclusions of 
these studies—whether the high rate of imprisonment can be attributed to systemic 
racial discrimination—will reflect such judgment. It has been common for research 
into systemic bias to control for the seriousness and volume of offences, in order to 
isolate the effect of the independent variable, ‘race’. Anthony invites us to consider 
what we are doing when we choose to control for these variables. She urges us—out 
of a sense of fairness and historical perspective—to take into account not only the 
seriousness and volume of offences (as in studies that both she and Weatherburn 
adduce) but also such ‘relevant extra-legal factors’ (Anthony 2013, p. 63) as socio-
economic disadvantage, membership of the Stolen Generations and 
alcohol/substance abuse. Anthony calls these variables ‘Indigenous-specific 
offending circumstances’. The justice system cannot help but be biased against 
Indigenous Australians, she argues, because it is part of a wider social structure that 
systematically reproduces ‘Indigenous-specific offending circumstances’. 
In arguing this way, Anthony shifts the discussion from methodology to culpability; 
or perhaps one could say that she is making us aware that methodological choices 
imply conceptions of historical culpability. To the extent that the ‘offending 
circumstances’ to which she refers are ‘Indigenous-specific’, these variables would 
not occur among the non-Indigenous cases. By definition, a statistical comparison of 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous prisoners that controls for ‘Indigenous-specific 
offending circumstances’ is impossible. Anthony’s recognition of ‘Indigenous-
specific offending circumstances’ is thus not so much methodological advice for 
quantitative social scientists but historical counsel for sentencing judges to consider. 
However, it seems to me that Anthony’s ‘Indigenous specific offending 
circumstances’ and Weatherburn’s four criminogenic sociological factors substantially 
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overlap; they both include, for example, socio-economic disadvantage, drug and 
alcohol abuse. The two authors are pointing to similar sets of social conditions that 
seem to be associated with high rates of offending and imprisonment, but they frame 
these factors in contrasting ways. Anthony argues that one way to correct the 
excessive incarceration of Indigenous Australians would be for sentencing authorities 
to treat the ‘Indigenous-specific offending circumstances’ as beyond the offenders’ 
culpability, and as justifying a lesser penalty than would be imposed on offenders not 
blighted by these ‘circumstances’. ‘In other words, Indigenous people should be 
receiving lesser sentences if they were to be treated the same’ (Anthony 2013, p. 63, 
emphasis in the original). Regretting that there is an influential tradition—in 
criminology and in popular morality—of emphasising individual responsibility, 
Anthony presents Indigenous Australians as a community of fate. That is, she presents 
them as a people afflicted by a shared history of colonial oppression that largely 
determines the circumstances generating offensive behaviour and that warrants 
leniency in sentencing. 
That Anthony considers Indigenous Australians to be a community of fate emerges 
particularly strongly in her account of what is known as the ‘Fernando’ principle—
the idea that a judge’s consideration of Indigenous offenders’ biography and 
background may justify a lenient sentence. There are stronger and weaker forms of 
this way of recognising Indigeneity as collective hardship and oppression. In its 
weaker form, a court will evaluate whether or not a community from which an 
offender can be seen as coming is ‘disadvantaged’. In the stronger form—evidently 
expressed in some decisions of the higher courts of South Australia (Anthony 2013, 
p. 148)—an Indigenous offender’s membership of a blighted community is assumed 
because what counts as ‘disadvantage’ includes the fact that as a category of the 
Australian population Indigenous Australians are excessively incarcerated. Anthony also 
cites many Northern Territory sentencing remarks that have recognised ‘Indigenous 
problems of alcoholism, poverty and violence as intrinsically connected to 
colonization, dispossession and displacement’ (Anthony 2013, p. 151). 
Sympathetic to sentencing policies that recognise disadvantage as Indigenous 
Australians’ aggregate historical dividend, Anthony is critical of the way that such 
judicial recognition has been weakened, since ‘Fernando’ was first formulated in 1992, 
by judges re-imagining ‘disadvantage’ as ‘dysfunction’. She cites cases in New South 
Wales and in the Northern Territory in which the community has been, in effect, 
held responsible for being ‘dysfunctional’ or in which its prolonged disadvantage has 
been understood as vitiating its ‘Indigenous’ quality. Her sixth chapter richly 
documents these trends in judicial reasoning (though she does not present the 
sentence given in each case that she examines). The aggregate effect of this discursive 
trend, she asserts, has been to contribute to ‘continual rises in prison populations in 
New South Wales, the Northern Territory and across Australia’ since 1991 (Anthony 
2013, p. 163). 
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If, for Anthony, the ‘Indigenous-specific offending circumstances’ constitute an 
Indigenous community of fate warranting aggregate exculpation or mitigation, for 
Weatherburn the factors are criminogenic social pathologies, found among both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders, that the state must remedy by applying a 
battery of public programs. In order to elucidate Weatherburn on this matter, it is 
useful first to contrast the way that Anthony and Weatherburn use history. 
Periodising colonial history 
Weatherburn explains contemporary incarceration in a way that distinguishes the 
causal weight of factors of recent origin from the background story of colonisation. 
He covers all of colonial history up to the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths 
in Custody (1987–91) in a mere six pages, before devoting 23 pages to the last twenty 
years, describing the criminological context and public policy consequences of the 
Royal Commission. In dealing with the period up to the 1980s, and drawing on the 
available statistics of imprisonment, Weatherburn follows Mark Finnane (1997) to 
explain why Aboriginal imprisonment fell (to the best of our knowledge) as state 
authority over Aborigines grew in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Factors reducing imprisonment were: the better regulation of police practices, the 
rise in the demand for Aboriginal employees in rural industries and the voluntary or 
involuntary inclusion of ‘surplus’ Aborigines in ‘protective’ institutions. It is 
significant that Weatherburn does not treat missions and settlements as essentially 
carceral institutions but as alternatives to imprisonment. 
Weatherburn presents employment as an historically dynamic determinant of trends 
in imprisonment. For Weatherburn, as for Noel Pearson (2009), the mode of 
Aborigines’ material survival as workers is of central importance in understanding 
their colonial history. Both Weatherburn and Pearson point to what they see as a 
recent fateful conjuncture in which relaxed state supervision (particularly of some 
Aboriginal people’s use of alcohol) coincided with the falling demand for labour (in 
regions where Aboriginal people had remained living on or near their ancestral land) 
and their greater access to cash welfare benefits. From a few regional examples, 
Weatherburn generalises that this combination generated a wave of criminal 
behaviour (including violence inter se) and a resulting rise in incarceration. For 
Weatherburn, the drivers of the contemporary rate of imprisonment have been 
recent contingencies of colonial political economy: Aboriginal people’s recent loss of 
‘their toehold in the mainstream economy’, combined with their access to alcohol 
and to cash welfare payments (2014, p. 17). 
Weatherburn distinguishes the history that he offers from the historical analysis on 
which the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody relied. Though 
suspicion of police or custodial malpractice and judicial discrimination actuated the 
Commission, what the Commissioners had to try to understand sociologically was 
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this problem of relatively recent origin: the extraordinary rate at which Indigenous 
Australians were being placed in custody by the 1980s. Weatherburn first lists the 
factors by which the Commission explained incarceration: unemployment, poverty, 
alcohol abuse, poor school performance, youth boredom, family dissolution and 
overcrowded housing. He then reminds us that the Commission embraced all these 
dimensions of disadvantage within a master concept: disempowerment. In 
Weatherburn’s narrative of public policy since the Royal Commission, the acceptance 
of the concept ‘disempowerment’ was a major error. It encouraged public policies 
that sought to relieve each of the ‘disadvantage’ factors by measures that purported 
to empower Indigenous Australians but which failed to reverse the rise in the rate of 
Indigenous incarceration. From 1992 to 2011, the proportion of the Australian adult 
prison population that was Indigenous rose from fourteen to 26 per cent (Anthony 
2013, p. 57). Weatherburn doubts that we can explain these continuing high rates by 
pointing to faulty or incomplete implementation of the Royal Commission’s 
recommendations—particularly the recommendations to decriminalise drunkenness 
and offensive behaviour. His preferred explanations of increasing rates of 
incarceration are: the rise in urban Aboriginal drug use (with associated property and 
violence offences) and—encouraged by greater public awareness of domestic 
violence—the increased willingness of police to tackle violence inter se. Weatherburn 
conjectures that incarceration would have decreased (or not increased as steeply) 
after the Royal Commission had more money been spent on programs that attacked 
drug and alcohol abuse, child neglect and abuse and poor school performance. 
Weatherburn argues that the single most important disadvantage suffered by 
Indigenous Australia in the post-Commission period was lack of human capital. 
When Australia’s twenty year economic boom arrived, too many Indigenous 
Australians of working age lacked marketable skills. As he puts it, ‘Indigenous 
empowerment is impossible when Indigenous people lack the human capital required 
to take advantage of economic opportunity’ (2014, p. 39). Parents are crucial in 
managing a child’s human capital formation, and Weatherburn’s summary of the 
cumulative impact of the colonisation of Indigenous Australians is that it has 
destroyed many people’s capacity for parenting. 
You cannot colonise a country, dispossess the original inhabitants of 
their land, destroy their traditional way of life, herd them into camps, 
remove large numbers of their children, put large numbers of their 
parents into prison and expect to find the parenting process unaffected 
(Weatherburn 2014, p. 117). 
He presents the following ‘vicious circle’ in which many Indigenous people find 
themselves: 
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Parents exposed to financial or personal stress, or who abuse drugs 
and/or alcohol are more likely to abuse or neglect their children. 
Children who are neglected or abused are more likely to associate with 
delinquent peers and do poorly at school. Poor school performance 
increases the risk of unemployment, which in turn increases the risk of 
involvement in crime. Involvement in crime increases the risk of arrest 
and imprisonment, both of which further reduce the chances of 
legitimate employment, while at the same time increasing the risk of drug 
and alcohol abuse. And so the process goes on … (Weatherburn 2014, 
pp. 86–87). 
For Weatherburn, the primary significance of these recently strengthened and 
uncorrected criminogenic circumstances is not their relevance to sentencing (though 
he does favour more experiments with alternatives to imprisonment); rather he 
presents the ‘circumstances’ as social pathologies that the state should be working to 
reduce with well-funded, targeted programs. Recently arisen, they are open  
to correction. 
For Anthony, by contrast, the problem of Indigenous incarceration is more deeply 
rooted, and the continuities in the Indigenous condition are more significant than the 
discontinuities. Anthony’s chapter ‘Historicizing colonial and postcolonial 
Indigenous crime and punishment’ (2013, pp. 30–54), drawing most of its material 
from the Northern Territory, argues that the Indigenous criminal is ‘a product of the 
historical relationship between the colonizing state and the colonized’ (Anthony 2013, 
p. 54). To be colonised is to be subject to varied and continuing custodial authority 
up to and including the contemporary criminalisation of Indigenous Australians. 
At the root of the criminalisation of Aborigines has been the project of dispossession, 
she argues. Dispossession has required a massive and continuing project of social 
control of the dispossessed. She draws attention to two continuities of colonial 
authority: the authority of private employers (particularly pastoralists) was an 
extension of the state’s formal authority; and the institutionalisation of Aborigines 
under ‘protection’ policy has continued in the contemporary punitive detention of 
convicted Aborigines. Assimilation policy changed colonial authority by granting 
formal equality to Aborigines. In a related development, the state curbed violence 
and corporal punishment and elevated imprisonment as the normal and legitimate 
way to punish. From the point of view of the dispossessed, however, the colonised 
condition has remained essentially unchanged and is evident, for example, in policing. 
Anthony acknowledges that colonial authority, in its actual administration of the law, 
has been slow to criminalise actions inter se (Anthony 2013, p. 38), but in gradually 
overcoming this de facto legal pluralism the state has been fulfilling its colonial destiny 
to make its sovereignty territorial, at the expense of any remnant exercise of 
Indigenous customary authority. 
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What of public policy? The dysfunctional parent and the empowered judge 
Another way to compare the histories and reforms offered by Weatherburn and by 
Anthony is to say that the relationship that Weatherburn hopes will change, with the 
right public policies, is that between certain Indigenous parents and their children; 
it is the duty of the state to change Indigenous families that are not working well. 
For Anthony, the problematic relationship is that between judicial authority and 
Indigenous authority. Let me say a little more about how Anthony narrates the recent 
history of judicial authority. 
In her fourth and fifth chapters Anthony presents a history of Northern Territory 
Supreme Court’s recognition of Indigenous customary law. From the 1930s to the 
1990s, judicial recognition of Aboriginal custom took a variety of forms. It included: 
advocating unsuccessfully that corporal punishment be allowed as a culturally 
appropriate alternative to imprisonment; conceding shorter sentences for those 
offenders least changed by colonisation; distinguishing actions inter se and either 
ignoring them or sentencing such offences more leniently; and attributing punitive 
and rehabilitative responsibilities to the offender’s home community. Changing 
representations of ‘Aboriginal culture’ informed this variety of recognitions, she 
points out, but one persistent motive of the judicial knowing of Aboriginal culture 
was the Court’s desire to legitimise colonial law in the eyes of Indigenous 
Territorians. However, in the 1990s, Northern Territory judges began to see risks in 
tolerance (and even encouragement) for Aboriginal custom: did not ‘custom’ 
legitimise violence (including statutory rape), especially by men against women? 
Judicial recognition of the interests of victims and of the norms of the wider 
Australian society began to displace the judges’ recognition of local ‘custom’ as a 
mitigating factor and as a source of (non-state) social control. The ‘community 
interest’ that judges were obliged to take into account came to be more the total 
Australian community and less the local, ‘dysfunctional’ Aboriginal community 
troubled by the offence. Judges became openly sceptical about ‘Indigenous law 
punishment’—not only in sentencing but also in bail hearings that decided whether 
the accused could be released to return to his/her community for punishment. They 
dismissed ‘Indigenous law punishment’ as illicit violence, as uncontrolled ‘pay-back’, 
and thus as part of the endemic violence within Indigenous communities. 
As policy intellectuals and governments reconsidered ‘self-determination’ policy, 
from the late 1990s, Aboriginal ‘culture’ began to be recognised by sentencing 
authorities as a contributor to ‘dysfunction’, particularly in men. To believe in 
‘Aboriginal society’ as something with the capacity to enforce (albeit with harsh 
measures) its own integrative norms has been an act of faith sustained in policy 
intellectuals, in politicians and in the public by ethnographic writing and by 
Aboriginal people’s evocations of their collective practices. That faith—which 
formed part of what Sutton has labelled ‘the liberal consensus’—ran strong from the 
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mid-1970s to the late 1990s (Sutton 2009, Rowse 2013). Anthony’s study of what the 
Territory’s judges have been saying since the 1990s amply documents the attrition of 
belief in ‘Aboriginal society’, as a positive force, among agents of state authority 
whose practice has so much shaped the modes of settler colonial rule: judges, 
magistrates, prosecutors and defenders. 
The sentencing and bail decisions that illustrate this trend became the focus of 
debate among both judges and the wider public, as Anthony shows. To understand 
where Anthony stands in that debate, we need to recall that her critical standpoint 
works on two levels. One level is that she deplores the ‘judicial backlash’ (Anthony 
2013, p. 128), preferring judicial representations of custom that affirm Indigenous 
capacities for self-regulation and that result in shorter custodial sentences or in non-
custodial punishment. At a deeper level, her critique questions the constitution of 
judicial prerogative itself, as recognition ‘sways between valorization of the functional 
role of culture and condemnation of its criminal tendencies’ (Anthony 2013, p. 107). 
Her deeper critique, that is, postulates post-colonial Australia as a dual jurisdiction. 
She advocates that the courts and agencies of correction and rehabilitation honour 
Indigenous sovereignty and provide effective roles for Indigenous authorities in the 
design and administration of sentences. Her concluding chapter strongly asserts the 
post-colonial principle that it is time for colonial authority to be more accountable to 
Indigenous law. 
These contrasting historical models—one emphasising the continuity of current 
Indigenous disempowerment with the colonial past, the other lamenting that 
‘disempowerment’ has become the explanatory focus—give rise to differences in the 
two authors’ public policy imaginations. Anthony’s radical critique of colonial 
jurisdiction does not lead her to clearly articulate public policy options for relieving 
Indigenous Australians of their excessive incarceration. To the extent that there are 
policy implications in Anthony’s book they focus on how judges work, but she is not 
explicit about how we could make judges more accountable to Indigenous authorities. 
Whether a more accountable judiciary could be brought about by the legislative 
unfettering of judges or by submitting them to a new procedural regime that binds 
them to work in partnership with Indigenous authorities is a public policy 
conundrum that arises implicitly in Anthony’s conclusion. Nor does she recommend 
removing any offences from the Northern Territory’s criminal code. She is silent on 
the question of whether punishment options should be expanded to include corporal 
punishment (countenanced by some Indigenous authorities). 
While Weatherburn says nothing about the deeper issues of the politics of colonial 
jurisdiction that animate Anthony, he devotes many pages to discussing particular 
public policy options that could be on governments’ agendas. His policy focus is 
much wider than Anthony’s: how ineffective families are to be helped; as well as how 
judges could be given more sentencing options. Clearly, he has not lost the faith that 
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well-targeted public spending can make a substantial difference, in the short-to-
medium term, to the lives of Indigenous people. From programs evaluated in other 
countries, he draws hope that Australian governments can punish certain kinds of 
offender without sending them to prison, including those who violate community-
based orders, those dependent on illegal drugs and juveniles (Weatherburn 2014, 
pp. 109–115). Going deeper, and on the basis of his view that colonisation has 
wrecked parenting in many Aboriginal families, he points to five criminogenic factors 
found in contemporary Indigenous Australia (but not only there) that public 
programs could tackle: unplanned and/or youthful pregnancy; child abuse and 
neglect (and he defers judgment on the Northern Territory Emergency Intervention); 
low school attendance, retention and performance; substance abuse; and 
unemployment. 
Community of fate? 
Since 1982, criminologists have been able to assemble data with which to compare, 
in each jurisdiction, the Indigenous and non-Indigenous imprisonment rates (per 
100,000 population). Such comparisons reveal excessive Indigenous incarceration to 
be a horrendous problem. Perhaps socio-historical analysis can lead to public policy 
remedies. The most thoughtful commentaries on this phenomenon have come from 
criminologists and scholars of law and order as a social process. Much of their work 
is quantitative sociology, but within their work we also find historical narrative, as it 
seems obvious that Australia’s colonial past somehow determines the contemporary 
inequalities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. In this paper I have 
asked: what difference do different narrative models of Australian history make to 
our thinking about contemporary Indigenous incarceration? To answer this question 
I have presented contrasts and similarities between two recent studies of factors 
contributing to excessive Indigenous incarceration. One model emphasises the 
continuity in Australian colonial history between all forms of institutional control of 
Indigenous Australians and their current high rates of incarceration; this model does 
not treat as significant the high proportion of Indigenous Australians who do not 
suffer imprisonment or adverse contact with the forces of law and order. It 
postulates Indigenous Australian, in effect, as a continuing ‘community of fate’, that 
suffers systemic, collective oppression rooted in the colonial past. The other model is 
more attentive to historical discontinuity—in particular to the distinction between 
recent criminal imprisonment and earlier regimes of institutional management—and 
it can deal with the differentiating effects of assimilation policy among Indigenous 
Australians. In this second model, Indigenous Australians have not continued to be a 
‘community of fate’, as some have flourished socio-economically while others live in 
ways that are both disadvantaged and criminogenic. The two models give rise to 
different perspectives on public policy. The former model problematises the law 
itself, and focuses on the issues of judicial authority and judicial reasoning; the 
approach of the latter model is not to question the law but to pathologise the law-
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breakers and to seek changes in social policy and in sentencing options that would 
optimise their social integration. 
The historical framings I have reviewed here differ in their openness to the 
exploration of social differences—‘respectability’, class—that seem to have emerged, 
as Kath Walker predicted, since the 1960s. Though Weatherburn generalises about 
the destructive impact of colonisation on Indigenous Australians, his analysis of what 
is wrong and his recommendations for action rest on a differentiating account of 
Indigenous Australians: not all of them have wound up in the vicious criminogenic 
circle that he has described. Weatherburn’s sociology makes three claims that should 
affect the way we write history. He reminds us that a significant proportion of 
Indigenous Australians do not have adverse contact with the criminal justice system; 
he points to the quantitative significance of a recidivist tendency among those who 
do have such adverse contact; and he identifies criminogenic socio-economic factors 
in such recidivism that are not unique to Indigenous Australians and that public 
policy could ameliorate. The word ‘recidivism’ is not in Anthony’s index. It is not 
part of her analysis to distinguish among Indigenous Australians according to the 
degree or nature of their contact with the criminal justice system. Their common 
relation to colonial power is, in her view, of greater significance. The inferred 
narrative trope that seems to discourage the exploration of significant differences 
among Indigenous Australians is that they constitute a ‘community of fate’—equally 
implicated as subjects of dispossession, protection and assimilation. The idea of all 
being equally implicated is reinforced in some of our uses of statistics. Statistical 
analysis aggregates Indigenous Australians in order to make Indigenous/non-
Indigenous comparisons, but the useful exercises of calculating population rates, 
means and medians should not licence the supposition that Indigenous Australians—
imagined as a statistical aggregate—are best understood historically as a community 
of fate. 
In particular, we should reconsider what assimilation did. Kath Walker predicted in 
1964 that Indigenous people would respond in different ways to its pressures and 
opportunities. Don Weatherburn’s study vindicates her forecast. A high rate of 
imprisonment sustained by a high rate of recidivism seems to have been one of the 
unintended outcomes of ‘assimilation’. The difference between those who have 
flourished in the wake of assimilation and those who have not is relevant to policy. 
Weatherburn’s approach is more productive of options for public policy, and in that 
sense his historical model is a better history to think with. As well, it encompasses 
realities that the alternative model obscures. Equally in line with Walker’s prediction 
is the observation that many Indigenous Australians do not have adverse contact 
with the criminal justice system and, using the opportunities that assimilation and 
subsequent policies conferred, they are getting by and perhaps doing well. 
An historiography is truncated if it is exclusively dedicated to accounting for what we 
nowadays call ‘Indigenous disadvantage’; our models of Australian colonial history 
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must also try to explain Indigenous flourishing and, one hopes, to inspire experiment 
in policies that enable it. 
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